Is the concept of Ultimate Reality coherent?

In the article, Wainwright begins by explaining the relationship between religion and humanity, and how it is rooted in human needs, yearnings, and experiences. He suggests that while each persons devotion, practice, and commitment may vary, all religious attitudes in essence have an "ultimate concern" which is total and requires the self as a whole, and makes all other concerns secondary. The object of the concern is thought to be separate from all profane and ordinary realities and is understood to be a mystery and holy. Thought to be an experience so consuming and precious, so real and powerful, that it requires total surrender and promises total fulfillment. With this he leads into the implication that the only object worthy of these attitudes should be the greatest thing we could conceive, the ultimate reality (89). Which according to Wainwright, is a fully appropriate object of ultimate concern that is maximally perfect, or in a sense the most perfect possible reality. This is where Wainwright begins his discussion of whether a maximally perfect reality is coherent. Introducing three arguments for its incoherence, he also provides several responses arguing against these points. The first argument is that there is a lack of standards for what we call an ultimate reality. Because while it may be comparable in some ways and nothing compares to its greatness in any way, it does not mean that it is the best in the same way. Therefore, implying that it cannot be included with everything else in a common class of comparison (90). The second argument dissects the incompatibility of some perfections. Pointing out that a maximally perfect reality is sometimes believed to possess all perfections, and thus makes it impossible due to certain perfections conflicting. To which some respond by indicating there are two classifications of perfections, pure and mixed; so when described to possess all perfections it is understood to possess only all pure perfections therefore no incompatible perfections. Others respond that a maximally perfect reality in fact does not have to possess all perfections, but that it must only possess the largest amount of  mutually compatible perfections (91). The third argument then suggests that a perfect reality is incoherent because it is not possible for something to be more perfect than a thing that is considered maximally perfect. So happiness, which is a declared property of ultimate reality, is thought to have no intrinsic maximum there is always the possibility of it being more happy, therefore more perfect. The responses to this however, argue that there is in fact an intrinsic maxima or that a maximally perfect reality can have properties with no intrinsic maxima so long as it can only be surpassed by itself (92). However, because there can only be one ultimate reality, the question arises that if our understanding of this is dependent upon our own individual attitudes and beliefs, how would this reality be able to satisfy such varying definitions and ideals of a perfect reality? Could it be that a perfect reality does indeed exist, however, it is past our ability to conceptualize and understand it. Meaning that it adheres to its own set of rules and definitions for perfections, different from ours, and is unknown to us. Why must the concept of a maximally perfect reality be limited to our definitions and comprehension, because isn't it possible that even though it is incoherent to us, doesn't mean that it doesn't exist.